Dodger wrote:can you shed some light on this feature ?
it's what it says, (on i386) it ensures that in kernel mode (ring-0) only the kernel's code is actually executable, and it also makes the code and read-only data, well, read-only. it is not as incircumventible as the userland equivalent, but there're some measures that at least make it not that trivial (basically a kernel bug and corresponding exploit would have to modify page table entries to circumvent the read-only feature or force somehow the reloading of the GDTR/CR3 registers with attacker supplied values). as i said, this is not that trivial, but certainly possible, and closing down this venue is what sealed kernel pages and the compiler change to verify control flow were going to fix (i just had no time for this so far).
Its not working , kernel is not booting
first of all, read
http://grsecurity.net/pipermail/grsecurity/2005-November/000616.html, if you haven't yet (the only news is that spender put this into grsec already). next, if you can help debugging your problem, i'd like to see your kernel .config (email it please), the exact symptom (at which stage the kernel crashes, what's last printed, etc, if you can catch it).
but i think noexec pages in kernel space is definitly a DO
it's been available for 2.5 years, just without module support.